The formation of yen bloc did not result in the economic and monetary integration of East Asian economies. Rather it led to the increasing disintegration of East Asian economies. Compared to Japan, Asian regions and countries had to suffer from higher inflation. In fact, the farther the countries were away from Japan, the more their central banks had to print the money and the higher their inflations were. Moreover, the income gap between Japan and other Asian countries widened. It means that the regionalization centered on Japanese yen was destined to fail, suggesting that the Co-prosperity Area was nothing but a strategy of regional dominance, not of regional cooperation. The impact was quite long lasting because it still haunts East Asian countries, contributing to the nourishment of their distrust vis-à-vis Japan, and throws a shadow on the recent monetary and financial cooperation movements in East Asia. This experience highlights the importance of responsible actions on the part of leading countries to boost regional solidarity and cohesion for the viability and sustainability of regional monetary system.
Introduction
There is now a growing literature that argues for closer monetary and financial cooperation in East Asia, reflecting rising economic and political interdependence between countries in the region. If such a cooperation happens, leading countries should assume corresponding responsibilities. For, the viability of the system depends on their responsible actions to boost regional solidarity and cohesion. Indeed, the historic experience of the past yen bloc shows that, given the absence of responsibilities of Japan, then the single most leading country, in maintaining the system, the so called "Asian Co-prosperity Sphere" created by the imperial Japanese government should fail. This paper examines the process of the formation and dissolution of the yen bloc during the period of 1937~45 and intends thereby to highlight the importance of regional cohesion for the viability and sustainability of regional monetary system. In fact, the yen block started with the worldwide trend of regionalization during the 1930s depression. As a response to the regionalization, Japan intended to create its own bloc devoid of Western influence and on the basis of autarky. This idea gained the momentum with the start of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. As the war was soon extended into the Pacific War and most of the East Asian countries were transformed into a set of colonies, satellites or occupied territories of Japan, Japan proposed the so called Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere with the yen bloc as the basic principle regarding money and finance in East Asia. More precisely, the yen bloc can be defined similarly to the sterling bloc. Sterling area means two things. "In the first place, the sterling countries keep their exchange rats fixed in relation to the pound. Secondly they hold their external exchange reserves partly and wholly in sterling in the form of bank balances or short term investment in London"[League of Nations(1936) ]. Interpreted in this way, East Asia during the World War II period was under the yen bloc, because the Japanese yen was the official anchor and at the same time other Asian countries than Japan had to hold yen balances. To this end, Japanese attempted "to divide the occupied regions into a number of appropriate districts in conformity with the administrative systems, and to let each district have its own system of note issuing central banks, the currencies issued by such institution being the only legal tenders of the respective districts and their value standards based on the Japanese yen" [The Oriental Economist(1942) ].
The studies on the yen bloc were carried out mostly by Japanese authors [Kobayashi(1975) , Shimazaki(1989) ]. For instance, Shimazaki described the history of yen bloc as the history of invasion of Japanese yen. Iwatake focused on the competition and conflicts in China between different Japanese and Chinese currencies during the Second Sino-Japan War. Their main objectives were, however, to explain the history of the yen bloc from Japan's viewpoint and thus they did not pay enough attention to the monetary and financial difficulties experienced by other Asian countries. The question of regional cohesion and solidarity was either neglected or insufficiently addressed. Apart from these studies, there are also quite many studies describing the monetary and financial situation of many other Asian countries during the Japanese colonization period from their own perspective [Young(1965a) , Banyai(1974) , Bae(1990) ]. For instance, Young traces out the historic development of Chinese monetary system minutely, collecting invaluable data and statistics on money, price and exchange rate in China. Banyai provides quite a comprehensive survey on money and banking in China and Southeast Asia during the period 1939~45. Bae focuses on monetary development of Korea during the colonial period. These studies could be used to understand the monetary developments and disarray in many Asian countries and regions caused by the Japanese attempts to extend the yen bloc. This paper argues that the formation of yen bloc did not result in the economic and monetary integration of East Asian economies. Rather it led to the increasing disintegration of East Asian economies (refuting the endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area). This is clear from the fact that the gap in inflation rate and income level between Japan and other East Asian countries widened during the Japanese occupation period. That experiment was frustrating for Asian countries. It means that the regionalization centered on Japanese yen was destined to fail, suggesting that the Co-prosperity was nothing but a simple propaganda of Japan. The impact was quite long lasting because it still haunts East Asian countries, contributing to the nourishment of their distrust vis-à-vis Japan, and throws a shadow on the recent monetary and trade cooperation movements in East Asia. This explains why ideas about regional monetary cooperation could rarely be heard of until the eruption of Asian currency crises.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, the formation process of the yen bloc is described. In Section 3, the features of the yen bloc are examined together with its enlargement. In Section 4, the consequences of the yen bloc are investigated.
The Formation of Yen Bloc
Well before the formation of Yen bloc, silver dollar played a pivotal role in linking many countries in East Asia and the world. Since the 16 th century, Western silver coins including Spanish and Mexican dollars have been widely used in China, Japan and other East Asia. These imported silver dollars were standardized in form, weight and finesse, and thus convenient. They soon became the media of exchange, replacing Chinese tael(liang) as the unit of account in East Asian monetary system, and were given a name yuan (according to Chinese pronunciation), yen (according to Japanese one) and won (according to Korean one). (1) Thus, there was already a natural currency zone in East Asia with silver dollar as unit of account. What Japan tried to accomplish with its idea of Yen bloc was nothing but to impose its own political and economic order to other East Asian counties on the basis of the military power. Naturally, the formation of (1) Yuan, yen and won all means "round", because, unlike traditional Chinese and East Asian coins, Western coins were round without any rectangular hole in the center.
the yen bloc goes along with the Japanese military occupation of Asian countries.
First Step
Japan was the first nation to modernize and successfully resist Western political and economic encroachments. Thus, Japan could have served as a model and aspiration to anti-colonial movements throughout Asia. Betraying this aspiration, however, Japanese leaders developed the same ambition as those of Western imperialist states and joined the global trend toward territorial expansion and colonialism. In the early 20 th century, Japan acquired its first colonial territories in Korea and Manchuria.
The idea for the yen bloc started with the colonization of these territories. The first Japanese bank that opened its business in Korea was the First Bank, established in 1873. Paralleling the deepening influence of Japan on Korea since the victory of Sino-Japanese war, the First Bank increased its business in Korea including the Korean government's finance and note issuing. In particular, to cope with chaotic monetary situation characterized by the circulation of numerous coins of different weights and standards, the First Bank was officially charged with harmonizing different currency standards and authorized to issue its own bank notes in Korea. To this end the Bank was allocated the maximum limit for the issuance of its notes, and at the same time, had to back up its issue by government securities and commercial papers as fiduciary reserves, let alone gold, silver and Japanese yen as specie reserves. After the Russo-Japanese war in 1905, Korea was declared a Japanese protectorate and then a colony, and at the same time the note issuing business of the First Bank came to be transferred to the newly created central bank, Bank of Chosun. (2) It is to note it was mostly the Japanese yen that was served as its reserve assets in issuing the notes of the First Bank and later of the Bank of Chosun, which exchanged at par with Japanese yen. In this sense, Korea was considered as the first country in East Asia that adopted the yen standard system, which would constitute the core principle of Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere in monetary affaires [Shimazaki(1989) ].
Manchuria and China
After the annexation of Korea, China would become a next candidate for Japanese It is important to note that by integrating Manchuria to Chosun-Japan on monetary and economic affairs, Japan joined the world-wide trend of creating economic blocs, which developed later into the idea about Japan-Manchukuo-China Economic Bloc. Given that the world had already seen appearing a sterling bloc centered on the UK and its Commonwealth and a dollar bloc centered on the US, it implies that the world was entering into the era of closed and self-sufficient economic blocs, replacing the era of international cooperation represented by Washington conference system [Shimazaki(1989) ].
The Marco Polo Incident took place on July 7, 1937, bringing Japan again into a war against China. The Second Sino-Japanese war snowballed of its own volition and finally the battle fronts extended over entire China, north from the Russian border to Central and south China. As Japan was in control of new areas, the management of newly occupied areas became urgent. backed by gold and silver and foreign currencies up to 40% or more of those issued. (5) It is to note that at this time, Japanese yen was rapidly attaining the status of a key currency country similar to the US and its dollar in the Western Hemisphere. The Japanese yen was identified with the industrial and political strength of Japan [Banyai(1974) Source: Y. M. Bae(1990) . Moreover, though the occupied area was immensely spacious, what Japanese army really put under control were cities and railways only, as signified by points and lines. It made it very complicated for the stationed Japanese armies to self-supply war materials. Even the Japanese were forced to obtain and use the Fapi notes to purchase the needed commodities from the country area. The National Government of Free China led the currency war against Japan at its advantage. The reason was that although it was linked to Japanese yen at par, the FRB note was inconvertible (no clause regarding the specie resumption). Thus its value had to be maintained by the exchange operations but its rate of exchange into foreign currency was fixed at too high a figure Bank of Japan initially for its military outlays. As the amount of Japanese yen notes in circulation was becoming larger and larger, however, its value dropped and the Japanese yen was transacted at a discount with regard to other currencies. Many of these yen notes flowed back to Japan and upset the monetary management of Japan. Japan were concerned about continuing devaluation of the Japanese yen. To prevent the use of these yen notes back in Japan, Japan decided to withdraw the Bank of Japan yen notes from circulation in Central China and to substitute in their stead military scripts or military notes to finance its military spending.
Although these military notes were denominated in yen and fixed at par with the Japanese yen, they were inconvertible to the yen and prevented from circulating in Japan and other areas. But to keep the exchange rate of the CRB notes stable turned out a heavy burden for the Japanese. In order to maintain it, the exchange control had to be reinforced gradually more strictly until at last all trade and foreign exchange transactions became impossible
Currency War between China and Japan
In the late 1920s as a result of imperialist rivalries and nationalist movements, the National Government of Free China (KMT) was able to bring nominal political unity to China after decades of war politics. In fact, the National Government could assume nationwide responsibility in 1928. It immediately recognized the urgency of economic and financial rehabilitation. Recognizing the need for a modern financial system, the new government created the Central Bank of China on October 6, 1928, which was to be reorganized as a true central (6) These military notes were overprinted on yen note in large red characters denoting for military use only.
bank. The bank was given the right to issue its own notes, to mint and circulate coins, to deal in foreign exchanges and to handle issuance and service of public loans. Notes were to have a reserve of 60% in silver or gold coin or bullion and 40% in government bonds or commercial
paper.
Yet monetary situation remained chaotic until the currency reform in 1935. The currency consisted of money of endless variety, differing place to place. The first step in monetary reform was the coinage reform, abolishing the tael as unit of account and introducing standard silver dollar, named yuan. Board to control note issue and keep custody of note reserves. Use of silver as currency was forbidden, and prices were in Fapi, the sole legal tender, with a managed and stable foreign exchange standard [Young(1965b, p. 166) ].
Because printing the banknotes was a major source of government finance for Japanese army as well as Nationalist Chinese Government, who faced up with continuing Japanese aggression, it turned out essential for wining the war between each other to win the currency war in which National Yuan (Fapi) and the currencies of Japanese sponsored banks competed with each other for stability and acceptability. As China managed to maintain independent management currency system, Fapi came to be supported by the UK and US, while the value of FRB and CRB notes by Japan.
To maintain the value of the Fapi, an Anglo-Chinese Exchange Stabilization Fund was set up on April 1939 with a capital of 10 million pound. Soon after its establishment, however, the Despite the currency war for stability, both the currencies of National Government of Free China and Japanese puppet Chinese governments circulated in parallel and China was plagued by hyper-inflation because the long lasting Sino-Japanese war necessitated ever increasing money printing for both governments. (See Table 4 below)
Yen Bloc under the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

Establishment of the Great East Asia Financial Sphere
The continual expansion by Japan into China led to deepening hostilities, especially between Japan and US. To check the military expansionism of Japan, the US prohibited its export of aluminum and scrap iron to Japan, froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total embargo on oil exports to Japan. However it did not stop Japan from indulging in military expansionism into the South East Asia, paving the way toward the Pacific war, which finally broke out in 1941.
With its invasion into South East Asia, Japan set up more comprehensive policy regarding regional order under the slogan of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, which was to include not only Japan, China and Manchukuo but also the South Sea Area including French Indo-China, Thailand, Malay Peninsula, Philippines and Dutch East Indies. In fact, this Japanese idea was nothing but the prolongation of the New Order in East Asia announced by Foreign Minister Konoye on November 3, 1938, just after the outbreak of Sino-Japanese war. The concept of this New Order entailed the establishment of political and economic interdependence and mutual aid among the nations of Japan, Manchukuo and China. Japanese pointed out that such a union would take its place among the other blocs of Western powers, resisting their aggressive advances. Japan hoped that it would have ended Japan's dependence on the Western powers for its raw materials for Japanese industry too. Asia for Asians was another catchword. South Sea
Area was essential to Japan as a source of raw materials such as coal, rice, iron, rubber and tin and in this respect fit in well with Japan's plan for Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
As Japan replaced the US and the European powers as the new imperialist state, the Pan-Asian idea was transformed into the propaganda under the name of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere. The German parallel was "Lebensraum." (8) "We must show the races of East Asia that the order, tranquility, peace, happiness, and contentment of East Asia can be gained only by eradicating the evil precedent of the encroachment and extortion of the Anglo-Saxons in East Asia, by effecting the real aim of the co-prosperity of East Asia, and by making Japan the leader of East Asia."
Immediately after the outbreak of the Pacific War on December 1941, Japan established However, as the military expenditures continued to increase and the inflation in the occupied area is accelerating, this institution was allowed to issue its own notes and withdraw the military notes from March 1943 and thereby was to be transformed into de facto central bank of issue.
The reason was that, to exploit the resources of the occupied area as much as possible, Japanese government had to eliminate the local currencies from circulation and to substitute in their place its own notes. (Similarly to South China)
In fact, during the Pacific war, the goal of the Japanese plan for financial control in the occupied areas was to establish its own Financial Sphere of Greater East Asia devoid of Western influence and thereby to exploit the occupied areas. The main principle of Japanese plan for the financial management of the Sphere was to use Japanese yen, for fixing the external value of the currencies of the Sphere, for maintaining a managed currency system, and for settling foreign exchange transactions in the Sphere, and thereby to eliminate old gold and silver standard or exchange system based on the US dollar and UK sterling. Briefly Japan hoped to set up a financial sphere with Tokyo as financial center, making yen as the anchor, reserve and settlement currency for Greater East Asia. The feature of this financial sphere can be examined in more detail as follows.
Features of Great East Asia Financial Sphere
Yen as a Anchor and the Par Link Policy
To establish yen as the regional anchor currency, the currencies of the occupied areas became linked at par with the Japanese yen. First in the case of the Bank of Chosun and the Bank of Taiwan, it was stipulated in the law that their notes be convertible into Bank of Japan notes at par without any reservation. Among Japan proper, Korea and Taiwan, there was no restriction of any kind with regard to exchange, circulation and transactions. In the case of Central Bank of Manchuria notes, the conversion was allowed nothing but for the travelers. As mentioned, this step was taken to protect the value of yen from depreciating as the volume of money in circulation and inflation rate were rising more rapidly in Manchukuo. In the case of the Bank of Inner Mongolia and the Federal Reserve Bank notes, which were exchanged at par with the Japanese yen, and in the case of the Central Reserve Bank notes, which were converted to Japanese yen at a ratio of 18 Japanese yen to 100 Yuan, however, there was a strict exchange control.
Since the outbreak of Pacific War in 1941, Japan abolished foreign exchange floatation in terms of US dollars and UK pounds. The exchange markets vanished and the Japanese monetary authorities had to decide directly the conversion rate between yen and other currencies on the consideration of various elements such as productivity capacity, natural resources, standard of living, etc. The conversion rate between yen and the currencies of the South East Asian countries was set up to be at par, 1 to 1, except for French Indochina and Thailand, where the existing rates of exchanges were available. Moreover, the exchange transactions with US and UK were completely suspended and these were limited only to Germany and Italy as well as the countries in the Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.
The par link of the currencies of South East Asian countries with Japanese yen implied that the value of these currencies dropped by two-folds, thereby reducing the import price of Japan by half compared with the level that prevailed in the prewar period and bring about the internal circulation of goods in Japan's favor. In fact, despite the fact that the conversion at par between yen and local currencies was unrealistic, this was possible due to trade and exchange control by the Japanese government. However, as the exchange rate became functionless as helping to correct trade imbalances or inflation rate differentials between different areas in the Sphere, there were lots of distortions and inefficiencies with the par link policy. Especially, as inflation differential with respect to Japan was accelerating in the occupied areas, Japanese government had to reinforce its trade and capital control. For, the imports of Japan from these areas tended to decline whereas the exports of Japan toward these areas increasing. (a hurdle for financing the necessary commodities for war).
Japanese government resorted to two policy measures. One was to use the subsidy system. It means that Japanese government charged the exporters as levy the differential between export price and domestic price and provided the differential between import price and domestic price as subsidy. The other was to use special conversion rate for Japanese imports. That is, importers were compensated for their loss in imports, using s special conversion rate between yen and the currencies of import areas.
Yen as a Reserve Currency
As mentioned, Japan established the central bank of issue or institutions of similar role in one occupied area after another, when necessity arose. These institutions in the occupied areas were subject to holding the reserves of the yen exchanges or the Bank of Japan notes. In fact, Bank of Japan extended on its own account monetary loans and credits to the various central banks of the Japanese controlled governments. 
Yen Based Settlement System
During the pacific war, Japan introduced a clearing system, with the international transactions between nations being settled via transfers on the account of the central banks of the contracting countries. In fact, this clearing system was modeled after the German Nazi's system, in contrast to the then UK or US system that consisted of setting up an exchange stabilization fund and intervening in the exchange market to fix the exchange rate [Shimazaki(1989) ]. Japan concluded many bilateral clearing contracts with the governments of the occupied and satellite areas. The first of these clearing agreements was made between Yokohama Specie Bank and Java Bank in 
Consequences of the Yen Bloc: Increasing Divergence
Contrary to the propaganda of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, there were widening economic disparities between Japan, its colonies and occupied areas. This increasing economic divergence can be examined in two respects. One is the inflation gap and the other is the income gap, which can be measured relying on the data collected by Maddison(1995) .
Inflation Gap
During the Japanese occupation, East Asia was also plagued by high inflation, with each area having its own system of note issuing bank and currency. It is noteworthy that compared to Japan and its close colonies, the regions at long distance such as Central and South China and South East Asian countries recorded relatively higher inflation. For instance, the inflation rate at the eve of the defeat of Japan in 1945 in Tokyo was little more than two times as high that in 1937, but reached several thousand or ten thousand times in China and South East Asia.
In fact, Table 3 shows that the farther away the region in question was from Tokyo, the higher seemed its inflation rate. Thus, there was also a widening inflation differential between Japan and other East Asian countries.
This was because the use of the yen linked currencies was not voluntary but imposed on the occupied regions. The occupied regions were especially obliged to meet the increasing Japanese war expenses, and as a consequence, their local central banks, most of which would be controlled by Japan, had to issue more and more the money. In fact, the farther the regions were away from Japan, the higher was the increase in their money supply, paralleling the inflation rate movement. This is clear from Table 4 .
One important instrument that obliged the occupied East Asian countries to issue more and more money was "the Local Borrowing System" introduced in 1943. Basically, the introduction of this system was due to the fact that with the rapid rise of inflation in the occupied area, occurred as a result of the increase in military spending, Japan had to procure ever more increasing amount of the Japan-sponsored currencies to cover up its military spendings. Given that the exchange rate of Japan sponsored currencies were fixed at par with Japanese yen, however, it means that the issue of the Japanese yen would have to increase as well. inflationary spiral in the Fee China area, which was the most serious in Chinese history, because the Nationalist Chinese Government (KMD regime) was also forced to finance the increasing war expenses by issuing its currency. (11) Moreover, for South-East Asian countries (except for Thailand and Indo-China), Japanese military authorities themselves issued their own notes (military notes) in local units, although they soon had to be replaced by the notes of Southern Development Corporation. Unlike central banking institutions in other occupied areas, however, the Southern Development Corporation had no maximum limit and no backing requirement for the note issue. Consequently, this region had to suffer higher inflation.
Growth Gap
Not only in the monetary matters but also in terms of real income, the gap between Japan and its neighboring countries widened. A. Maddison (1995) offers quite a comprehensive data for the prewar period national income in some selected East Asian countries. Although incomplete and sometimes very roughly estimated, it is the only available one that makes in common unit the comparison of national income between countries during the period of Japanese expansion. It will be thus useful enough to look at the changes of per-capital incomes of the East Asian countries on the basis of his study. control, it was likely that the rising economic gap between Japan and these latter countries might reflect the former colonial economic structure rather than the result of the Japanese occupation. It is however still true that Japanese occupation of these countries did not bring about the coprosperity promised by Japan. In fact, as some observers put it, "the Japanese occupation caused The exact reason why these countries were relatively more backward than Japan is very difficult to know because the experience of these periods were very complex, compounded by war and worldwide depression etc. But the growth performance during and after this period suggest a hint about what might have happened in Asia if these countries had regained their sovereignty. In fact, Japan achieved far faster growth than any other Asian countries, for instance by earlier nation-building and westernizing its institutions. Other countries were late in these efforts or at least prevented from doing so by Japan. After the defeat of Japan, however, other East Asian countries could take off, starting the process of catch up with Japan. The catch up was evident especially since the1970s. (12) Destined to Fail: The History of the Yen Bloc (12) For instance, the per capita incomes of Korea and Taiwan in 1970 were respectively 23.3% and 24.4% of the Japanese income but since then they rose to 48.3% and 55.6% in 1990 and in 2000.
Conclusion
Japanese idea about the monetary management of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity
Sphere dates back to the integration of Korea and Manchuria to Japan. It is extended through the Japan-Manchukuo-China Economic Bloc to the idea of Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.
No matter how the idea developed, however, there was the same underlying objective: to exploit the neighboring economies as much as possible to the sole benefit of Japan. In fact, the experience of the Japanese invasion and occupation period shows that the economic and inflationary gap between Japan and other East Asian countries continued to be widened. There was no effort to fill the gap, showing the solidarity necessary for the maintenance of the bloc.
Rather, the other East Asian countries had to sacrifice their interests to support Japanese military expansionism unilaterally. Indeed, it looks like that what Japan attempted to achieve was to establish the hierarchical relation between the countries that dominate and are dominated. It means that Japan pursued a strategy of regional dominance, not of regional cooperation. Clearly it could not be acceptable to East Asian countries otherwise than on the basis of military forces.
Moreover, all these ideas were based on nationalism, which included exclusiveness and closedness to the other parts of the world. It means that the so called Co-prosperity was nothing but a Japanese propaganda.
The result was that after the Word War II, it took relatively very long time for Japan to normalize its diplomatic relation with neighboring Asian countries. Even after the economic relation with Japan became quite important, it helped these countries to distrust Japan, justifying the reluctant attitude of East Asian governments toward Japan initiated ideas regarding regional monetary and trade cooperation. In fact, the US emerged as the new and sole hegemonic power in the region. Under American leadership, the postwar East Asian economy became much more liberal, multilateral, and interdependent. This new world order led to an unprecedented expansion of the East Asian and world economy, providing a good opportunity to fill the economic gap that existed between East Asian countries and the US on the one hand and the Japan on the other hand. This is another good reason why Japan initiative ideas about regional cooperation received only a very lukewarm welcome in the region.
(12) Similar trend is observed for other East Asian countries.
